Spain - macroeconomic outlook 2013-2014
yoy change (%), unless otherwise stated
2013
2014
IMF
(October 2013)
European
Commission
(autumn 2013)
Spanish
government
budget
Consensus
forecasts, Spanish
analysts (14
January 2014)
(1)
IMF
(October 2013)
European
Commission
(autumn 2013)
Spanish
government
budget
Consensus
forecasts, Spanish
analysts (14
January 2014)
(1)
Macroeconomic figures
GDP
-1.3
-1.3
-1.3
-1.2
0.2
0.5
0.7
0.9
Household consumption
-2.8
-2.6
-2.6
-2.5
-0.4
0.1
0.2
0.6
Public consumption
-2.0
-3.0
-2.3
-1.6
-2.9
-2.1
-2.9
-1.6
GFCF
-7.3
-6.6
-6.1
-6.2
-2.8
-2.4
0.2
-0.9
Capital goods
-0.3
0.3
2.6
3.6
Construction
-10.5
-10.3
-5.8
-4.2
Domestic demand
-3.5
-3.4
-3.2
-3.0
-1.4
-0.8
-0.4
-0.2
Exports
5.7
4.5
5.7
5.3
5.8
5.2
5.5
5.8
Imports
-1.0
-1.9
-0.3
-0.1
1.8
1.5
2.4
3.0
Foreign balance (contrib. GDP)
1
1.7
1.2
Other indicators
Employment
-3.9
-3.6
-3.4
-3.1
-0.7
-0.8
-0.2
0.0
Unemployment (% active workforce)
26.9
26.6
26.6
26.4
26.7
26.4
25.9
25.6
Unit labour costs
1.0
0.5
0.1
0.1
0.3
0.1
Household savings rate (% of GDI)
(1)
10.6
10.6
Current account balance (% of GDP)
1.4
1.4
1.7
1.1
2.6
2.6
2.8
1.8
Govt. deficit (% of GDP)
-6.7
-6.8
-6.5
-6.7
-5.8
-5.9
-5.8
-5.9
Gross public debt (% of GDP)
(1)
93.7
95.9
99.1
101.2
Source: FUNCAS. (1) Source: FUNCAS forecasts.
The restructuring and clean up of the financial
system is on the right track
The reform, restructuring and recapitalisation of Spain’s
banking sector as set out in the
“Memorandum of Under-
standing”
(MoU) continued to progress in 2013. Progress
on bank solvency and liquidity, and with sector regu-
lation and supervision, has contributed to increasing
confidence and improving market sentiment towards
Spanish banks.
The improvement in funding conditions in financial
markets over recent months has been reflected in lower
systemic risk indicators for Spain, and a major reduction
in the gross drawings by Spanish entities from the Euro
system.
In 2013, Spanish entities returned around 30% of the
aid previously received, sold off non-strategic assets,
disposed of packages of problem debt and increased
their capital ratios. It is very likely that all surviving
Spanish entities will pass the new
“Tier 1”
or
“Core Capital”
stress tests (nearly all exceeding 9%); however, the rapid
rise in the overall non-performing loans ratio (now
approaching 13%) means that the level of provisions
will have to be reconsidered and questions need to be
asked about whether the aid received will be sufficient
to get the financial system back to normal, with orderly
and frequent credit flows to companies and individuals.
23
The Market Environment
Annual
Report 2013
BME
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